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The vote of 29 November 1947 at the General Assembly of the United Nations in 
favour of the creation of the State of Israel is often glorified as a humanitarian gesture, a 
universal expression of remorse and repentance for the Holocaust. Likewise, the crucial 
Soviet support of the State of Israel is associated with the common struggle of the 
Russian and Jewish peoples against Nazi Germany. The Soviet stand is particularly 
striking considering the consistent negative attitude of the regime to Zionism, and the 
overt pro-Arab line taken by the Kremlin during the Arab riots of 1929 and 1936, 
denouncing the Yishuv as the ally and tool of British imperialism.1  
 
The shift in the Soviet attitude, from blatant antagonism towards Zionism to an effusive 
support, is often associated with the German attack of the Soviet Union on 21 June 
1941. It is argued that the ties, established by Moscow with both world Jewry and the 
Yishuv in Palestine, reflected in the first place the need to enlist the support of the world 
Jewish community to the Russian war effort. The war, it  is suggested, provided the 
Russians with new opportunities to “find a way to extensive circles in the Western world 
in order to gain maximum support for its struggle against Nazi Germany”.2 The logical 
conclusion is therefore, that “the overriding desire to defeat Germany remained the 
common goal of both parties throughout the war years”.3 It is hardly surprising therefore 
that the common struggle against fascism through the establishment of a Jewish Anti 
Fascist Committee in Moscow in April 1941 and a V-League in Palestine, and the 
contacts established with the leaders of the Yishuv are strictly examined within this 
context and are assumed to be the single Soviet objective4. The obvious temptation is to 
assume that the common struggle against Fascism, the awakening of Jewish 
conciousness in Russia (through the activity of the committees) and the Soviet 
recognition of Jewish contribution to the war effort, created the congenial atmosphere 
for the Soviet drift towards a support of the State of Israel.  
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And yet, it is well established that all endeavors of the Jewish Anti Fascist Committee to 
embark on a road of its own were frustrated by the Kermlin. Attempts by the 
Committee to regenerate its activities in the wake of the war, by enlisting sympathy of 
“progressive” Jewish public opinion in the West in support of Soviet aims, were 
discouraged by the government in Moscow.5 Those organizations were in fact strictly 
prohibited from expressing "any views" on international politics in general and "on the 
question of the Jewish State of Free Palestine" in particular. Their objective, in line with 
dozen of akin organizations, such as the Trade Union Congress in England or the 
International Red Cross, was confined to exert pressure on the Americans and British 
to extend material aid to Russia.6  
 
The opening of the Russian archives show the far more complex circumstances which 
led to the Soviet recognition of the State of Israel and further demonstrate that the 
activities of the committee and the contacts with the Yishuv had little in common and 
served differing purposes even if at times the objectives seemed to overlap. Put in a nut 
shell it has been commonly believed that the Nazi onslaught on Russia brought the Jews 
and the Russians together. It may therefore come as a surprise that the initial and 
significant encounter with the Russians, which drew their attention to the potential asset 
of the Zionist movement, occurred prior to the German invasion of Russia – 
paradoxically at the height of Soviet Russia’s collaboration with Nazi Germany under 
the aegis of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. Stalin, wrongly assuming that the end of the 
war was imminent, was strivng to improve his political standing in the anticipated peace 
conference, which he hoped would readdress the European balance of power. In that 
respect the future of the British empire, which he perceived to be Russia's main 
adversary, assumed a special significance.7 
 
Virtually no relations had existed between the Jewish Agency and the Soviet Union in 
the decade preceding the outbreak of war. In Autumn 1940, the Jewish Agency for 
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Palestine set up a special committee whose task was to deal with the fate of the Jews 
from Poland, the Baltic countries and Bessarabia, the territories which had been 
absorbed by the Soviet Union. However, their efforts to send a special delegation to 
Moscow were abortive.8 An astute observer of international politics, Chaim Weizmann, 
the President of the World Zionist Organization, seemed to have perceived the genuine 
aims of Soviet policy. In early 1941 he opened up a channel of communication with the 
ubiquitous Soviet ambassador in London, Ivan Maisky, greatly exceeding the immediate 
and short-term agenda set by the committee. In their first meeting at the end of January 
1941, Weizmann alerted Maiskii to the possibilities which would open up for the 
Russians in the region were they to cooperate with the Jewish Agency. As would 
become customary for the Yishuv leaders Weizmann elaborated ad nausea the socialist 
features of the Jewish settlements in Palestine, harping on Soviet ideological 
predilections and hoping to drive a wedge between the Russians and the Arabs on the 
one hand and the Russians and the British on the other hand. To impress his interlocutor 
he commented wryly that the British Mandatory administration "called us communists..., 
and the Russian government regarded us as counter-revolutionaries". Like his associates 
in the Zionist movement, Weizmann seemed oblivious to the subsidary role which 
ideology played in Stalin’s political game.  
 
But Weizmann seems to have deliberately left out of the report to Jerusalem the most 
significant part of the talk. "Palestine", he tried to allure Maisky, "has no market for her 
oranges - would the USSR take them in exchange for furs?" Oranges for furs was 
merely the bait for a long-term strategy, which would come to fruition in 1947, of 
enlisting Soviet political support for the creation of a Jewish State. To avoid the 
inevitable pitfalls in future cooperation Weizmann was even prepared to sacrifice Soviet 
Jewry which he expected to be fully assimilated in twenty or thirty years. He pinned his 
hopes on the 6-7 million Jews living in Germany, the Balkans and Poland. He 
recognized of course that were Germany to win the war those Jews would “simply 
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perish”. But the prospects of a British victory posed serious challenges to the Zionist 
leadership.  Here Weizmann certainly won Maiskii's attention by making the fairly blunt 
observation that:  
 
The British - and especially their colonial administrators don't like Jews... 
in Palestine there are big and complex problems. It's true that the 
Palestinian Arabs are the guinea pigs the administrator is used to, but by 
contrast the Jews reduce him to despair. They are discontented with 
everything, they ask questions, the administrator constantly feels that the 
Jew is looking at him and thinking to himself: You think you are intelligent 
but maybe I'm twice as intelligent as you are. This turns the administrator 
decisively against the Jews, and he begins to praise the Arabs. Things are 
quite different with them: they don't want anything and don't bother 
anyone. 
 
He clearly tried to impress on Maisky that British victory, though obviously desired by 
the Yeshuv, seemed to hold bleak prospects for its political aspirations. Weizman’s 
scheme envisaged the rescue of central European Jewry, with Soviet help, to be 
followed by a "move of a million Arabs who are now in Palestine to Iraq, and to settle 
four or five million Jews from Poland and other countries on the land where these Arabs 
were." The major problem was, he threw the gauntlet at Maiskii, "how do we obtain 
this land?"9 
 
There is no denial that the resort to Russia came more naturally in the wake of the 
German invasion on 22 June. In a second meeting with Maisky in September Weizmann 
made a blunt overture, seeking to forge a new alliance by suggesting that in England "the 
Jews are not given any opportunity to express their attitude to the war, and in Palestine 
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the British hinder the formation of Jewish troop units".10 These overtures were by no 
means fortuitous. A month later Ben-Gurion himself met Maisky and, like Weizmann, 
went out of his way to demonstrate his empathy for the Soviet experience, 
notwithstanding the fact that he had been known to be a notorious opponent of the 
Bolshevik revolution. Rather awkwardly he insisted on presenting himself as "the 
representative of Jewish labour in Palestine" who only "happened to also be  the 
chairman of the Jewish Agency" for eight years. He then went on to impress on the 
Russians that Labour, though "not a communist movement", was "the leading group in 
the Jewish community in Palestine... the main colonizing factor in Palestine". Though 
Zionism was "a matter of life and death" for the movement, he told the rather bemused 
Maiskii, it was also "very serious" about its socialist aims, and the proof was the 
successful construction in Palestine of a "nucleus of a socialist commonwealth". 
Ideological lip service paid, Ben-Gurion now reverted to his main concern: the Soviet 
attitude towards Palestine in the future. Regardless of the calamity which had befallen 
the Red Army, he envisaged Russia to be "at the least one of the three leading powers 
which would determine the fate of the new world". Consequently, he wished to impress 
Stalin with the tremendous strides which the Jews had made in Palestine. Hoping, like 
Weizmann, to create a rift between the Russians and the British, he insisted that 
regardless of Britain's policy in Palestine the Jewish community had evolved into "the 
only organized labour movement in the whole of the Middle East", a fact which was "not 
without some importance to the international labour movement". He finally produced the 
bait by elaborating the Yishuv dircet contribution to the war effort.11 
 
It is important to note that the Russians were not easily swayed by the generous offer of 
material support and seemed to be much more concerned with the political 
repercussions of these fresh contacts on their future standing in the region. Indeed all 
attempts to foster relations with Moscow through direct assistance to the war effort 
proved to be abortive. An offer made in Ankara by Eliahu Epstein, Head of the Middle 
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East Division at the Political Department of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, to send a 
team of doctors with field hospitals to the Eastern Front was turned down by the 
Russians. Incidentally, Epstein too did not miss the chance of educating the Russians 
about the "Yishuv's social composition" and lecturing "at length on the labour movement 
in Palestine and on its achievements in various spheres". It should be emphasized that 
the offer of assistance merely served as a pretext for establishing a new political 
platform as became obvious in Epstein’s conversations with Vingoradov, the prominent 
Soviet ambassador in Ankara: 
 
… over the years Russia had adopted a mistaken political orientation 
towards those circles in Palestine and in the neighbouring countries who 
had quickly been revealed as agents and henchmen of Nazism. I dwelt on 
the clericalist, reactionary social background of the mufti and his gang 
and on the anti-democratic character of the Arab national movement in 
its various manifestations in Palestine and in the neighbouring countries. 
 
Epstein went on to describe the mighty economic potential of the Zionist settlement in 
Palestine which, he argued, had not yet been properly exploited and which “in certain 
circumstances might also prove beneficial to Soviet Russia."  
The Soviet ambassador went out of his way to convey the gist of Soviet foreign policy, 
denying that his country had ever cultivated "a negative attitude towards Zionism (!), 
and if they persecuted Zionists it was because they had exceeded the bounds of 
permissible political activity in Soviet Russia; ... Soviet government policy pursued a 
realpolitik and that their attitude towards religion could serve as an example of their 
considerations for elements which they had formerly dismissed".12 
 
Weizmann persevered in his efforts. He continued to address long letters to Maiskii and 
even extended his efforts to Washington, where in May he met Litvinov, the Soviet 
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ambassador and former Commissar for Foreign Affairs. On those occasions he drew 
up "three of the most fundamental aspects of the Soviet social philosophy" which he 
believed to be embodied in the Zionist "national system" in Palestine: the economic 
structure based on collective welfare rather than on individual gain, the planned 
economy and the fact that "the vast majority of adherents of Zionism have close 
personal and family relations with the USSR, and a peculiar interest in, and special 
sympathy with, its people". His reference to Russia's future role in the region became 
more open with the "brilliant" successes of the Russians on the battlefield. These, he 
wrote to Maiskii, would "contribute to lifting the pall of darkness now hanging over a 
distracted world, and that the forces of progress and freedom will then unite in order to 
undertake the work of reconstruction which will lie before them."13 
 
The Kremlin reacted cautiously. On 31 August, 1942, a Russian delegation headed by 
Sergei Mikhailov, the first secretary of the Ankara embassy, arrived in Palestine and 
met the leadership of the Yishuv. Their interest in Palestine, however, remained 
negligible. Faithful to the spirit of collaboration with their Allies, they continued to press 
for Arab-Jewish reconciliation. But each of the new encounters brought home to 
Moscow the increasing disillusionment of the Jewish population with the British 
Mandate, intensified by the issue of the White Paper of 1939 which curtailed Jewish 
immigration to Palestine. In the absence of a Soviet diplomatic presence in Palestine, 
such fact-finding tours became instrumental in laying the foundations for the future. 
Indeed, the guests seem to have been most impressed with the vitality and strength of 
the Yishuv. Mikhailov expressed "his amazement at the Jews' achievements here, saying 
that this was beyond anyone's dreams". Moreover the Russian guests were told that it 
"would be to their advantage to introduce extensive Soviet activity in Palestine on behalf 
of their country and their regime".14 
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The turn of the tide in the war in summer 1943, increased the Russians concern about 
their international role in the post-war world. Though still committed to cooperation with 
the West, Stalin's suspicion of British aims deepened and was further magnified by the 
bitter controversy over the second front. The first direct attempt to determine the Jewish 
plans for Palestine was made by Litvinov, on the eve of his recall to Moscow. He tried 
to elicit from Nahum Goldmann, member of the Jewish Agency Executive and its 
representative in Washington, whether any understanding had been reached with Britain 
and the State Department "about postwar plans for Palestine and whether the British 
were still courting the Arabs".15 The growing tension with the West and the need to plan 
for post-war reconstruction led Stalin to recall Maisky as well. The two were appointed 
as deputy ministers for foreign affairs. Well versed in European affairs they were 
entrusted with the planning of the peace conference. Litvinov was replaced in 
Washington by the thirty-five-year-old Andrei Gromyko, who was immediately faced 
with an urgent plea by Goldmann for Russia not to "remain indifferent to the problem of 
Palestine and the problem of the Jews of Europe". Recognizing the stature of the Soviet 
Union as a great power, he urged the Russians "to take a position on the solution of the 
Jewish problem and the settlement of the Palestine question".16 
 
Before leaving London, Maisky was briefed by Weizmann about conversations he had 
held with Roosevelt in June. It was then that the Russians learnt that the American 
President had proposed to Churchill to convene a Jewish-Arab conference to settle the 
Arab-Jewish problem. Fully aware of the Soviet apprehension of a dictated 
arrangement, Weizmann made full use of the information to goad Maisky into seeking 
direct Soviet involvement. Despite his notorious caution, Maisky this time expressed 
confidence "that the Soviets would support them".17 On his way to Moscow, Maisky 
spent three crucial days in Palestine as a guest of the British mandatory administration. It 
gave him a unique opportunity to gain a first-hand impression of the viability of the 
Zionist movement in Palestine and the capacity of the country to absorb a considerable 
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Jewish immigration. His meeting with Ben-Gurion and other leaders of the Yishuv in 
Ma'ale HaHamisha and the exemplary kibbutz of Kiryat Anavim left a tremendous 
impression on him. For Ben-Gurion the transformation in the Soviet stance was "a 
revelation"; he could "hardly believe" it. Subsequently Ben-Gurion submitted to Maisky 
a long memorandum highlighting the emerging Jewish dominance in the region. In 
follow-up meetings in the Soviet legation in Cairo Moshe Shertok, director of the 
Jewish Agency's Political Department, submitted more precise data. He clearly wished 
to convince the Russians that by the end of the war the Jews would control the 
economy and "gain political domination" in Palestine by establishing a majority of two 
million Jews to one million Arabs. Hence the efforts to enlist Russia's support would 
become more pronounced. Maisky indeed compiled a long report for Stalin upon his 
return which apparently opted for support of a Jewish State.18 Golda Meir, a prominent 
leader of the Yishuv and later Foreign Minister, recognized the significance of the visit. 
Her impression was that Maisky was determined “to know whether it was possible to 
do something in this country, so that when the time came, when they would have to 
express an opinion on the Jewish problem and on Palestine, he would have first-hand 
knowledge. We had the feeling that this visit was of great value”.19  
 
The Russians remained on their toes to ensure that they were not excluded from any 
peace arrangement. From the Zionist perspective, the groundwork pursued diligently 
throughout the war, and the association of the Palestinian leadership first with Nazi 
Germany and now with Britain, was starting to pay dividends. When Goldmann met one 
of Stalin's closest associates, Umanskii, at that time ambassador in Mexico, it was 
apparent that although the Russians had not yet "taken a formal position" the old 
animosities with Britain and mutual suspicions were resurfacing fast. Umanskii 
expressed his fears that Britain might steal a march and consult the Russians only after 
an agreement had been reached with the Americans. He vouched the Russians were 
bound to "stand up against both". However, to ascertain that the Yishuv might indeed 
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provide Moscow with a trump card, he once again wished to learn about the prospects 
of Jewish immigration to Palestine and the settlement plans. He and Goldmann minutely 
surveyed the numbers of Jews surviving in the territories now under Soviet control, 
country by country, finally reaching the figure of a million. Clearly, the most effective 
way for the Russians to intervene directly in the region was by facilitating Jewish 
emigration to Palestine from the East European countries now under their control. 
Consistent with the line pursued since Weizmann's first meeting with Maisky in 1941, no 
claim was made on Soviet Jewry, considered lost to the Soviet state.20 
 
Soviet relations with the Arabs remained extremely precarious. In Moscow the creation 
of the Arab League was believed to have been "incited and supported by the British in 
so far as it suits their plans to reinforce their influence in the Middle East and to establish 
a barrier against any possible penetration of Soviet influence there". Their precarious 
political state meant that Arab unification could occur only "under the aegis of a ruling 
power", which at present was Britain.21 Relations with the Jews were more complex. 
On the one hand the prospects of cooperation seemed bright. Soviet ambassadors kept 
conveying assurances from the Jewish leadership that they preferred the Big Three to be 
involved in a final agreement "rather than only a British guarantee". They appeared quite 
resolute "not to orient the Jewish state towards only one group."22 But the close ties of 
the Yishuv with American Jewry threatened eventually to tilt their loyalties toward 
Washington. It was therefore advisable to refrain from making "any statements in 
support of the idea of creating a Jewish state". The Soviet position on the eve of the 
Yalta conference was therefore one of "wait and see", to be determined finally by the 
degree of cooperation of the Allies. The pretext for their involvment in the region 
appeared to be confined to the "return of all Russian property" in Palestine, especially 
that of the Russian church.23 
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Though the Palestine issue was not raised officially at the Yalta Conference, unofficial 
talks led to an understanding that the British evacuation of Palestine would be preceded 
by some sort of international trusteeship. The Soviet perception of international affairs in 
the wake of Yalta was that allied unity should be preserved after the war. They 
anticipated that the "Big Three" would be able to work harmoniously as a global police 
force, operating within the framework of a peacetime Grand Alliance, demarcating 
Soviet and Western spheres of influence. But the spheres of interest overlapped, as they 
had done in the 18th and 19th centuries. They were not confined to Eastern Europe, but 
also included oil concessions and spheres of influence in the north of  Iran, control of the 
Turkish Straits and the strategic bearing of Palestine.  
 
Indeed the report of Litvinov's commission on post-war reconstruction, which followed 
the Yalta Conference did not reveal any genuine Soviet interests in the region beyond 
the desire to be on a par with Britain and the United States. The preparatory work 
done by the Zionist leadership continued to produce dents in the Soviet outlook on the 
region. Litvinov described "the considerable achievements of Jewish colonization" in 
terms which could only compete with the pamphlets produced by the Yishuv itself: "a 
large part of the uncultivated land has been turned into fertile fields, marshes have been 
drained, the breeding-grounds for malaria have been destroyed, there has been much 
afforestation, health care has been improved, some industry has been developed, such 
as processing diamonds and extracting and treating chemical deposits from the Dead 
Sea", and so on. But notwithstanding the enthusiasm it is worthwhile noting that when he 
came to analyse the Arab-Jewish conflict the grim conclusion was that there were no 
viable "plans or projects for the solution of this complex Palestine problem".  
 
Stalin’s attention was increasingly diverted to the region by the growing American 
involvement, which was believed to be motivated by the wish to secure the free flow of 
Saudi oil. The British reluctance to abandon Palestine was attributed to their strategic 
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need to guard their strategic assets,  particularly the approaches to the Suez Canal. 
Soviet interests, it seemed, could be best protected by a transferral of Palestine "to the 
collective trusteeship of the three states - the USSR, the US and Great Britain". It is 
worth noting that, given the insoluble nature of the conflict, the Russians preferred to 
overlook the political repercussions of the trusteeship.24 
 
The further Stalin felt excluded from the regional peace arrangements, the closer he was 
pulled into direct involvement. The early warning signs were Truman's comments to the 
New York Times on 17 August 1945, in the wake of the Potsdam summit meeting. 
Truman admitted that the future of Palestine had been the subject of talks with Churchill. 
"There was nothing", he insisted, "that the Generalissimo could do about it anyway." The 
Western Powers had rejected Molotov's proposal, made during the foreign ministers' 
meeting in Moscow in December 1945, for Russia to evacuate Iran if England 
evacuated Egypt and Palestine. At the beginning of 1946, Aleksei Shchiborin, the 
Soviet Minister in Cairo, was recalled for a whole month of discussions in Moscow. 
Together with Daniil Solod, Chief of the USSR Mission in Syria and Lebanon, he was 
entrusted with Palestinian affairs. He too made a thorough tour of Palestine, and 
returned ever more convinced that a solution without Soviet participation would be to 
their disadvantage. The chill was swiftly creeping back into Anglo-Russian relations. 
Shchiborin hoped the British would remember that Palestine was "situated not only on 
the route of British imperial communications, but also on the sea routes to various ports 
in our own country". Litvinov's Reconstruction Committee, committed to reconciliation 
with the West, was receiving a kiss of death.25 
 
In March 1946 Truman granted $400 million in aid to Greece and Turkey to withstand 
Soviet pressure. Stalin complained to the American Ambassador in Moscow, General 
Bedell Smith, that the United States was colluding with Britain against the Soviet 
Union.26 A month later the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry for Palestine was set 
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up, leaving the Russians out in the cold. However, the hostile attitude of  the Arabs and 
the ambivalent Jewish reaction to its recommendations (to permit the immigration of 
100,000 Jewish DPs to Palestine in 1946 while rejecting the idea of either a Jewish or 
an Arab state) resulted in strong Arab and Jewish protests. The conclusion of the 
Jordanian-Turkish Pact in early 1947, together with the Turkish-Iraqi plans for the 
establishment of a Turkish-Arab bloc, further pointed to a deliberate scheme to create a 
strategic environment under British domination. The continued British presence in the 
region had become totally unacceptable for the Russians.27 
 
The Jewish boycott of the conference convened in London by the British Government in 
December 1946, to discuss the creation of an autonomous region in Palestine under a 
federal framework, also drew them closer to the Russians. Although the Arabs rejected 
the plan, fearing that it might lead to partition, their cooperation with the British 
continued.28 The Jewish Agency was quick to seize the opportunities provided by the 
bitter confrontation. The Russians had at last been dragged into the conflict "on a par 
with the other Middle Eastern issues over which [they] and England are at loggerheads, 
such as Libya, Italy, Greece, Turkey, and so forth". There were clear signals of 
increasing tensions between the Americans and the British regarding both the fate of the 
100,000 DPs and the future of the Mandate, which the Russians were keen to exploit. 
In fact, the DPs have become hostages, their fate serving as the main leverage for 
undermining the British Mandate and also for driving a wedge between the Americans 
and the British.29 
 
Soviet opposition to a unilateral British solution was now certain. Moreover, the fact 
that the Russians had no firm position on the nature of the solution opened new 
opportunities, principally in the transfer of the issue to the Security Council. Epstein, in 
Washington, was duly briefed: 
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Not only is there no reason to expect Russian policy to be hostile to us, 
there are grounds for thinking it will be friendly. Not out of sympathy to 
us or out of hatred towards the Arabs, but in order to settle political 
accounts with England. If anyone is liable to lose, it is first of all the Arabs 
and the English. The former will have to accept Russia's supervision, and 
the latter its participation in all matters relating to the East. Legitimate 
supervision and legitimate participation. Supervision which may 
undermine the entire political and social structure throughout the Arab 
East, and participation that may limit even more the evolution of self-
government in the Arab East.30 
 
The impasse reached in the two rounds of the London Conference led Bevin to 
propose a five-year trusteeship which would prepare the ground for statehood later on. 
In a way it was a compromise between the British and the Arab points of view, barring 
the idea of a partition. Bevin wrongly assumed that the Jews would be as reluctant as 
the Arabs to raise the matter at the United Nations, mostly because of Truman's hostile 
attitude. The main opposition, however, emerged from the Chiefs of Staff, who feared 
that a multilateral trusteeship would "effectively destroy [the British] strategic position in 
the Middle East". They further expected the Russians to use it as a vehicle to infiltrate 
the region. On 18 February he informed Parliament of the decision to refer the matter to 
the United Nations.31 
 
The referral of the Palestine issue to the United Nations compelled the Russians to 
define their rather diffuse ideas. In early March the Near East Department of the 
Russian Foreign Ministry prepared guidelines for the special Soviet delegation to the 
United Nations. Appraising the course of the London Conference and the 27th World 
Zionist Congress in Basel (of 9 December 1946), the Committee noted  that neither 
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side in the conflict favoured the idea of international trusteeship promoted by the 
Russians. They deemed it necessary to preempt the British, whom, they suspected, 
were "looking for new ways of enabling them to go on governing Palestine with the 
approval of the United Nations" rather than evacuating the region. Rather than a genuine 
move the referral of  the issue to the United Nations was in their opinion "a very adroit 
diplomatic manoeuvre". Typically for Stalin at this stage, he was slow to come to grips 
with the emergence of the United States, rather than Britain, as Russia's mortal enemy. 
"Truman's efforts to carry out his own policy in the Eastern Mediterranean," as a 
prominent Soviet diplomat argued, "have proved to be timid, ill-timed and unsuccessful. 
Truman is not distinguished by far-sightedness, nor by a statesman's breadth of view. 
His actions reflect the habits of a minor civil servant, who is used to counting the change 
left over in the morning for fear that the cook might have cheated him, but who has 
happened to land in a high position without losing any of his habits."32 
 
To combat the British plot, a four-point plan was adopted by the Kremlin. Its core was 
an unequivocal call for the termination of the British Mandate and the withdrawal of 
British troops from Palestine. This part of the policy had been and remained a consistent 
feature of Soviet policy, fluctuating only in degree since 1941. The next two points were 
a novelty. They were in fact tactical rather than strategic and therefore would remain 
fluid. For the first time the Soviet Union made a clear stand on the political future of 
Palestine and the Jewish question, to which it hoped to harness the support of the 
United States and perhaps Britain. They advocated the creation of "a single, 
independent and democratic Palestine" whose citizens would "enjoy equal national and 
democratic rights". They opposed immigration of Jews to Palestine, assuming that the 
Jewish problem could be best solved through the democratization of Europe and the 
eradication of the roots of Fascism. The memorandum was adopted verbatim as the 
Kremlin's policy, apparently seeking a common denominator with the Americans while 
displaying a marked indifference to both the plight of the Jews and the nature of the 
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political settlement in Palestine. But the days of the memorandum were numbered. The 
four points already reflected ambiguities and uneasiness concerning the role of the 
Powers and the United Nations, characterizing the transition from the spirit of the Grand 
Alliance to the Cold War, about to erupt in full force.33 
 
While many would argue that Churchill’s Fulton "iron curtain" speech was the first shot 
fired in the Cold War, it is more likely to have been Truman's speech to the Congress 
on 12 March. His aim was to raise financial aid for the Greek and the Turkish 
governments, ostensibly under threat. Though the Soviet Union was not mentioned by 
name, it was clear that the real target of Truman's speech was communist subversion. 
The idea of a global defence against Soviet expansionism was taking shape. "The 
language of power and force," Truman argued, "was the only discourse Soviet leaders 
understood and responded to." It took Stalin another month to digest the implications of 
the speech, as he was still driven by a perspective of cooperation with the West.34 
 
Gromyko entered the preliminary procedural meetings of the United Nations armed 
with the March guidelines. However, the debate on the the formation of the Special 
Committee of Enquiry on Palestine reinforced the Soviet suspicion a collusion between 
the United States and Great Britain, in an attempt to join forces in preventing an 
elaborate discussion of the essence of the Palestine question. He gained a strong 
impression that both countries were employing delaying tactics. The work of the 
Committee would provide them with sufficient time to "reach an amicable agreement 
between themselves about the fate of Palestine, and they would try to reconcile the 
initial positions which they had held prior to UN analysis of the Palestine question". 
Truman's containment policy was now examined in Moscow against the background of 
developments in New York. The Russians may well have also been influenced by the 
serious deterioration in the domestic situation in Palestine between February and July 
1947, when terror gained the upper hand. 
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On 28 April, the day on which the Special Session of the General Assembly convened, 
Gromyko received a new directive which entirely reversed the earlier one. He was 
suddenly asked to change the line and emphasize the "unparalleled disaster and 
suffering" inflicted on the Jewish people during the war. This was merely a prelude to a 
dramatic change in the Soviet attitude towards the solution on the ground. While the 
urge to terminate the Mandate remained the axis on which Soviet policy rotated, 
Gromyko was instructed to "consider various projects for meeting Jewish needs, 
bearing in mind two possible alternatives: the first was the creation of a dual Arab-
Jewish state with equal rights for Jews and Arabs". The other, questioning the viability 
of the first, suggested that if Jewish-Arab relations deteriorated, a proposal should be 
put forward in support of "the partition of Palestine into two independent states - Jewish 
and Arab". But a subsequent telegram from Molotov explained that the first proposal of 
a dual state was merely motivated by "tactical considerations". Molotov wished to avoid 
the inevitable impression that Russia was now taking the initiative in the creation of a 
Jewish state, though that option, as he explained, "better conveys our position". 
Gromyko was further asked to press for a hasty transfer of the 100,000 DPs into 
Palestine. Obviously conceived to be a Troyan horse. The suspicion of Anglo-American 
collusion was further reinforced when George Marshall briefed the press on 6 May. In 
reply to a question whether the United States had a clear position on the Palestine issue, 
Marshall said that the question would not arise until Palestine was included in the system 
of UN trusteeship. But he inflamed already mounting Soviet suspicions when he saw fit 
to add that the transferrence of a League of Nations mandate to a UN trusteeship was 
"a voluntary rather than automatic act".35 
 
The change of heart is astounding. The implementation of the original agenda would not 
only have dealt a death-blow to Jewish aspirations, but would have changed entirely the 
history of the Middle East. Gromyko's speech on 14 May should be read in the light of 
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these revelations. The Russians had succeeded in referring the Palestine issue to the 
United Nations and in forging an effective coalition against the continued British 
presence in Palestine. The political programme for Palestine which advocated partition 
was surely part of the scheme, creating the favourable conditions for a hasty withdrawal 
of the British from Palestine. The Soviet coup took all the participants by surprise. The 
British and Americans believed that advocating partition was only a Soviet device to 
ensure the creation of a dual state. The Jewish Agency, unaware of the catastrophe it 
had avoided, took the credit for the change, attributing it to their meticulous preparatory 
work. But to the delegates in the United States, it was obvious that the change was a 
result of a "coincidence of interest and attitude". In Stalin's impressive arsenal of 
realpolitik manoeuvres, placing Russian interests above all, support of the Jewish State 
was neither the first nor the last marriage of convenience.36 
 
The Marshall Plan, or the European Recovery Program, announced by US Secretary of 
State General George Marshall in a speech at Harvard on 5 June, was, from the 
Russian point of view, a confirmation of the soundness of their policy. The initial Russian 
reaction was ambiguous. They were naturally tempted by the economic incentives 
offered by the States, which theoretically did not exclude Russia. But it shortly became 
clear that the plan aimed at restoring the European economy in order to forestall 
communist subversion in the Continent. The Paris conference of the Foreign Ministers in 
July convinced Stalin, as Molotov stated on 2 July, that the plan was aimed at dividing 
Europe and that peacetime alliance was no longer an option.37 
 
The impression gained in Moscow, preceding the General Assembly in the autumn, was 
that the British, aided by the Arabs, had done everything possible to "hinder the work of 
the committee and diminish its authority". They entrenched themselves even deeper in 
their support for the partition plan.38 In their now amicable communications with the 
  
20
 
delegates of the Jewish Agency, the Russians openly admitted that "it was as much in 
Russia's interest as in our own that we achieve independence in Palestine".39 
 
It thus emerges that the die had already been cast in May 1947. The dramatic vote of 
29 November would certainly not have taken place if the Russians had not made their 
dramatic volte-face in the spring. It was left to Creech-Jones, the British Colonial 
Secretary, now isolated, to inform the UN General Assembly on 26 September of the 
British decision to withdraw their forces from Palestine. He repeated that statement on 
16 October, after the Americans and Russians had come out in favour of the solution. 
The brilliant Russian move made both the Americans and the British take a back seat.40 
The prime incentive for the Russians was to see an immediate end to the Mandate and 
to the presence of British troops there. And yet, though the driving force behind Stalin's 
policy was expediency, transient opportunities and Russian national interests, there are 
abundant signs that the switch was viewed as heralding a long-term association with the 
new Jewish State. Before the final meeting of the General Assembly, Vyshinskii, who 
now joined the delegation, was instructed from Moscow, in unequivocal terms, that "to 
consult the Jewish opinion on all important questions concerning Palestine. In particular, 
this must be done on the matter of Jerusalem, for which it will be necessary to introduce 
a special statute which will safeguard the interests of the three religions." The effective 
preparatory work done by the leaders of the Yishuv in the preceding five years, to 
convince the Russians of the viability and strength of the emerging state, not to mention 
its socialist leaning, now bore fruit. Vyshinskii was told not to "be alarmed by a large 
minority of Arabs in the Jewish state, provided that it is less than 50 per cent. This 
situation will not threaten the existence of an independent Jewish state, since the Jewish 
element in the state will inevitably increase."41 
 
Stalin was an unscrupulous but  rational real-politician whose policies served well-
defined geopolitical interests. His support for Israel in 1947-48 was a direct outcome of 
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the exigencies of the ongoing Cold War, rather than reflecting concern for the plight of 
European Jewry in the Second World War. This was absolutely clear to the Zionist 
leadership from the outset. The reality of the divisions into two camps, and the 
circumstances which led to the creation of a state positioned on such a crucial strategic 
crossroads, meant that Ben-Gurion's hopes of adhering to a non-aligned position was 
unrealistic. A couple of weeks prior to the vote, a leading member of the delegation of 
the Jewish Agency was summoned to Dean Rusk, the director of the United Nations 
section of the State Department, and future Secretary of State. Rusk, who during the 
war had served as a Colonel on Marshall's staff, received him in the Foreign Secretary's 
suite of his New York hotel. He warned the Jewish Agency in unequivocal terms, for 
their "own good", to: 
 
… avoid any appearance of a tie-up with Russia. People were puzzled by 
Russia's stand in favour of partition; by the novelty of what seemed to be 
a pro-Zionist policy. Now there was this talk behind the scenes of Jewish 
displaced persons gathering at Constanza in the Black Sea and sailing for 
Palestine from the Russian zone - a circumstance we ourselves might 
regard as reflecting a humanitarian attitude by the USSR, but which 
others might interpret as a Great Power manoeuvre, in which the 
displaced persons were pawns, to embarrass the Anglo-American 
grouping. Mr. Rusk advised us to look into the effect on the United States 
and the western world of any special link being attributed to the Zionists 
and the Soviet Union.42 
 
Gromyko's speech in October paled in comparison to his speech in May. The foregone 
conclusion allowed the Russians to maintain a relatively low profile in the conflict. For 
Gromyko it was far more important to emphasize the recognition of Russia's position as 
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a major power whose voice had to be heard in any major international arena. He went 
out of his way to emphasize that Russia did not have any "direct material or other 
interests in Palestine", but was "interested in the question of Palestine because it [was] a 
member of the United Nations and because it [was] a Great Power that bears, just as 
do other great powers, a special responsibility for the maintenance of international 
peace."43 
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